

What is Human & Organizational Performance (HOP)?

"HOP is a collection of better beliefs, assumptions, thoughts, and ideas – from diverse and varying sources – applied through the lens of a core set of principles." - Sam Goodman

The Principles of Human & Organizational Performance (HOP)

(T. Conklin)

Error is Normal
Blame Fixes Nothing
Context Drives Behavior
Learning Is Vital
How We Respond Matters
Controls Save Lives

The Key Ideas of Safety Differently

(S. Dekker)

People are the Solution
Ask Them What They Need to be Successful
Safety is the Presences of Positives, not the Absence of Negatives

10 Ideas to Grow HOP

(S. Goodman)

Start From a Place of Trust
Do Things with People
Learn Deliberately (and Often) From Those That GSD (Get Stuff Done)
Pain Points are Starting Points
Become Obsessed with the Things That (Actually) Matter
More Tools – Less Rules
Stop Trying to Comply (or Punish) Your Way to Operational Excellence
Redefine "Safe"
Give Up On "Safety Fortunetelling"
Embrace Humanity

Key Ideas for Learning Teams

(S. Goodman)

Operational Reality Lives Nearest to the Work
Seeking to Understand Lived Operational Reality Affords Us Opportunities to Improve (Often Pre-Event)
The Deeper We Learn About Lived Operational Reality, the Better Our Improvements Will Be
We Are Better at Solving Problems Together
Providing Deliberate Time and Space for Reflection is Vital

Key Ingredients for Learning Teams

(S. Goodman)

An Environment in Which Honesty is Possible
Operational Curiosity
Better Questions
Time and Space to Think, Ponder, and Reflect
The Goal
Micro-Experimenting

Important Ideas Relating to HOP

- HOP is a collection of better beliefs, assumptions, thoughts, and ideas – from diverse and varying sources – applied through the lens of a core set of principles (Goodman)
- Error is not intentional (J. Reason).
- Errors are consequences of the environment/system (adapted from Conklin).
- Saying an event was caused by error or not following procedure is like saying an object fell due to gravity – its always true, it just doesn't tell us anything (Conklin).
- Everything made perfect and total sense to those involved in an event, until it suddenly didn't make sense anymore (Goodman)
- Seeking to understand how things made sense to those involved in an event is a good improvement strategy (Goodman)
- All (negative) events were unexpected to those involved
- Blame hurts our systems
- Blame and pain makes people feel less accountable, not more (Goodman)
- Blame is common, because it is easier to blame than improve
- We can always blame, but we must understand that it is a deliberate choice to know less (Goodman)
- People cannot control when they will become complacent (aka go on "autopilot")
- People are goal driven
- People are wired to use the least amount of energy to obtain that goal
- Normalized deviation is a system problem
- Rules that are prone to deviation are discoverable when we talk to those closest to the work
- Our common response to deviation prone rules is not effective in changing behavior
- You have two strategies after an event: blame and retrain, or learn and improve (Conklin)
- Discipline is designed to fairly remove someone from our system, not "teach someone a lesson"
- Accountability and discipline are different
- Accountability can be created without meeting pain with pain
- There is no such thing as a simple process – we work in complex organizations (adapted from T. Muschara)
- Failure is not linear – many conditions contribute to a failure
- Fixing a "root cause" alone will not prevent a future event
- Procedures cannot fully define work (Conklin)
- Our employees encounter (undocumented) variability everyday
- You cannot improve a system without understanding context (how work is done).
- You must learn from the people that do the job to understand context
- We have many biases that prevent us from learning about context
- Learning takes a concerted effort
- The types of questions we ask are important
- If we think we know the answer, we don't ask the right questions
- If our questions are designed to test a theory, we will get it wrong (almost) every time
- Safety is not the absence of errors, it's the presence of defenses
- We want to focus on unacceptable risk, we cannot bubble wrap the world
- We need layers of defenses – Some defenses are stronger than others
- We want to design defenses that let us fail safely, especially for "stuff that kills you" (STKY), "stuff that really matters (STRM), and "stuff that bankrupts you" (STBY)
- The simplest way to navigate all the above factors is to learn from and develop defenses with both those that do the work and those that designed the process TOGETHER (aka, using a learning team).